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The urgency of the problem of agency in science communication is 
perhaps best exemplified in the 2012 trial of the L’Aquila Seven in 
Italy: Six seismologists and a public safety commissioner were 
convicted of manslaughter for failing to adequately warn residents 
of a 6.3-magnitude earthquake that killed hundreds. Though the 
conviction was overturned in 2014, L’Aquila nevertheless 
demonstrated the high stakes of answering questions such as these: 
Who has the right and/or obligation to speak in policy debates 
informed by science? What are the proper limits in these forums to 
the agency of scientists? And how do we mete out justice in 
disasters whose agency is distributed among specialists, 
bureaucracies, computer models, instruments, media, and citizens 
(not to mention geologic faults)?  
While L’Aquila—and related controversies in climate change, 
stem cell therapy, and genetic modification—may have forced these 
agency-related dilemmas into high relief, they are hardly new to 
science communication. Humanist scholars who work on science 
studies have long been concerned with issues of representation, 
civil negotiation, and equity in public debates about science, 
technology, engineering, and medicine (STEM). The concept of 
agency sits at the heart of all these concerns.  
Definitions of agency vary, but most begin with the idea of the 
freedom to make choices and take actions that benefit an agent. To 
that foundation, most rhetorical theories of agency add an 
acknowledgment of the social and political forces constraining the 
agent—often using Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad to attribute 
these forces to opposing “agents” or to elements of the “scene” 
(Burke, 1969). Other frameworks invoke Richard Vatz’s or Jenny 
Edbauer Rice’s models to attribute agency not just to particular 
actors but to kairos—the rhetorical exigence or drama as a whole 
(Burke, 1969; Vatz, 1973; Biesecker, 1989; Edbauer, 2005). Carolyn 
R. Miller, working in this vein, established what has proven to be 
the field’s benchmark definition of rhetorical agency: “the kinetic 
energy of performance that is generated through a process of 
mutual attribution between rhetor and audience” (Miller, 2007, 
137). In other words, to enact agency, a rhetor must both intend to 
act as an agent and be recognized as such by the other agents 
operating in the rhetorical situation.  
This is how we have traditionally understood agency in the 
rhetoric and communication of STEM. However, recent crises have 
posed challenges to this understanding. Take, for example, the role 
that computer models played in the L’Aquila recommendations and 
the proliferation of conflicting information about the causes of 
climate change on Internet media: How do intention and 
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recognition operate in these emergent, cascading, networked 
kairoi? 
Carl Herndl and Adela Licona welcome these challenges, 
deeming them a benefit of postmodern attention to “the rhetoric 
and cultural practices of non-dominant and subaltern subjects.” 
They propose re-defining agency as the combined action of all the 
elements of Burke’s pentad, as “a shifting relationship between 
constraints and resources” (Herndl and Licona, 2007, 27; 28). 
Celeste Condit and her co-authors stress the complexity of post-
modern agency in their study of public understanding of genetic 
information (Condit et al., 2009). They found that participants did 
not view individual agency and genetic determinism as mutually 
exclusive; rather, the relationship crucially depended on how 
genetic information was framed and delivered. Tom Goodnight has 
pointed out the layers that advocacy adds to agency (Goodnight, 
2009). And Leah Ceccarelli presented several cases in which 
advocacy worked at cross purposes with the agency of citizens 
impacted by AIDs, climate change, and access to science education 
(Ceccarelli, 2011). 
Untangling the complexities detailed by these researchers is an 
exigent task with real consequences, as we witnessed in the 
unfolding of the L’Aquila crisis. Being able to craft better 
communication about climate change policy, or knowing how to 
deliberate genetic engineering policies—these civic abilities 
crucially depend on the questions of who has a right to speak on 
those issues, and how those agents can best be heard. But 
answering those key questions also requires updating our 
understanding of rhetorical agency in a high-tech, media-saturated, 
world-risk context.  
Accordingly, we convened at the National Communication 
Association’s 2015 meeting a preconference symposium on the 
issue of agency in science communication. The Association for the 
Rhetoric of Science, Technology, and Medicine (ARSTM) sponsored 
the symposium, at which peer-reviewed panels of junior and senior 
scholars presented their current research. From these presentations 
organizers gleaned four topoi around which the inquiry appeared to 
circulate: automation, biopolitics, risk, and publics. In the 
afternoon, discussion groups coalesced around these topoi and 
produced the following statements of terms, problems, and 
questions that we believe must be addressed in the next five years 
to promote and support equitable agency in science 
communication.  
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The symposium was convened in honor of the retirement of 
Carolyn R. Miller, who has, perhaps more than any other scholar, 
helped to call the attention of her STEM rhetoric and 
communication colleagues to the exigent problem of agency. 
Fittingly, therefore, this manifesto concludes with a response from 
Miller, in which she suggests the Great Chain of Being as a 
metaphor that may help us better appreciate the interlocked, 
organic complexity of rhetorical agency in STEM communication 
crises. 
AUTOMATION 
In the past two decades, complex models and computerized 
systems have become increasingly influential in our lives in areas 
such as economic decision-making, weather forecasting, and 
community planning. However, the processes and judgments built 
into these automated systems are not transparent.  
Rhetoricians of science and technology interested in how 
strategic choices shape understanding and action are uniquely 
positioned to address the questions of automation and agency that 
arise from the newest phase of automation. In deliberations on this 
subject at ARSTM’s 2105 preconference, we considered two 
directions of inquiry—critical and methodological—that might 
guide further scholarly development of these subjects. A critical 
program of inquiry would investigate the ways in which arguers 
enact agency in relation to automation. Carolyn R. Miller explains 
and thus demonstrates how automation mediates agency and how 
agency is mutually attributed in the interplay of rhetor and 
audience (Miller, 2007). James Wynn has investigated how non-
expert citizen groups have used Internet-connected devices to 
measure noise pollution and radiation to gain agency in arguments 
about risk (Wynn, 2016; see also Kelly and Miller, 2016). Jacob 
Rawlins and Greg Wilson have also looked at how interactive data 
displays constrain and enable the rhetorical agency of users 
(Rawlins and Wilson, 2015). Additionally, Ian Bogost has shown 
how game designers shape the actions and attitudes of players 
through design choices (Bogost, 2007).   
Despite these efforts to critically explore agency and 
automation, a number of topics still deserve attention. For example, 
scholars have yet to substantively investigate how choices of and 
assumptions in mathematical algorithms impact the outputs and 
the interpretation of outputs in automated systems. Cases in point 
are algorithms that calculate global temperature measurements and 
drive search engines. These systems significantly impact public 
arguments about privacy and security, and raise issues about 
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disparities between public and technical agents (Galloway, 2004; 
Ingraham, 2014; Roundtree, 2013).  
Our working group also recognized the capacity of automation 
to invent and support new methods for analysis. Rhetorical scholars 
have already begun developing machine-assisted projects to 
identify figures in argument and assess affect in discourse (Kaufer 
and Ishizaki, 2012; Ridolfo and Hart-Davidson, 2015). As we begin 
to use automated analytic methods, safeguards need to be 
developed to ensure the transparency of data and to clarify 
assumptions inherent in the methods. Mixed-methods approaches 
pairing automated methods with more traditional rhetorical 
analyses can likely help expose such inherent assumptions and 
subjectivities; methodological disclosure and transparency are 
essential for training the next generation of scholars. 
BODIES, EMBODIMENT, AND BIOPOLITICS 
Although our group initially formed to discuss the relationship 
between agency and biopolitics, the conversation required us to 
expand our theme to bodies, embodiment, and biopolitics. These 
terms not only accommodated key points of difference between the 
theoretical orientations of the bodies participating in the ARSTM 
preconference; they also reflected inherent tensions between the 
theoretical touchstones that have inspired inquiry in rhetorical 
studies of science, technology, and medicine.  
To be sure, scholars have long contested what “counts” as a body 
(Haraway, 1991). Increasingly at the heart of this question is the 
evolving definition of “materiality” as mediating the relationship 
between bodies and agency. A key theoretical incommensurability 
exists between a perspective that partially locates agency in the 
relational capacity of sensing and feeling humans; a perspective 
that construes human and nonhuman bodies as actants in an 
institutional network; a perspective that places a body “with” 
agency as an effect of a larger biopolitical regime; and a perspective 
that defines agency as provisional and radically relational 
arrangement between objects (Condit, 2013; Latour, 2005; 
Foucault, 2010; Keränen, 2007; Foley, 2010; Barad, 2007). 
Notably, several participants in our symposium identified rhetorical 
studies’ anthropocentric tendency as ignoring the agency of animal 
and other non-human, non-linguistic entities (Bennett, 2010).  
While there were disagreements in some of our basic 
operational definitions of bodies and agency, a number of critical 
terms productively tethered the disparate theoretical traditions 
implicit in our discussion. The questions of agency, bodies, 
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embodiment, and biopolitics have been perennially connected to 
rhetorical concepts of attributive voice (and voicelessness); 
collective and distributed subjectivity; and affect (Miller, 2007; 
Foley, 2010; Deleuze, 1980/1987; Massumi, 2002).  
As we meditated upon a necessary and just trajectory for the 
next five years, we recognized the importance of addressing why we 
insist upon returning to bodies as a theoretical site of invention. 
How will theories of agency change based on technologies that 
trouble the boundaries of bodies and embodiment? How might 
sensory perception constrain and enable rhetorical action within 
imminent spatio-temporal contexts? Participants left hopeful that 
agency can remain a shared problematic as our entanglement with 
bodies becomes increasingly diverse.  
PUBLICS 
Rhetoric has traditionally been understood to maintain a 
humanistic conception of agency that can mistake an individual 
speaker as “the point of origin rather than a point of articulation” 
for persuasive acts (Gaonkar, 1993, 263). The ideal of a public 
sphere, with its powerfully constraining structural effects, can 
correct origin myths about individual rhetorical agency (Goodnight, 
2012; Habermas, 1989). Indeed, Carolyn Miller reminds us to 
gauge the contribution of context and community to every 
rhetorical action (Miller, 1993a, b; 1994). But the interaction of 
publics and agency is complex (Miller, 2005). 
Our group was led to formulate three key questions about public 
agency in science communication: First, how do we deal with 
epistemological differences between experts and lay publics? The 
“deficit model” of public understanding of science has itself proven 
deficient (Hart and Nisbet, 2012). Citizen science is frequently 
touted as an alternative model, but these projects are still almost 
entirely controlled by scientists themselves (Bonney, Phillips, 
Ballard, and Enck, 2016). So, the search for a rhetorical model of 
the public understanding of science must continue (Goodnight, 
2005). 
Second, how do we cope with denialism, manufactured 
controversies, and other self-interested challenges to scientific 
authority in our theories of publics and of agency (Ceccarelli, 2011; 
Mooney, 2005)? Understanding these encounters requires parsing 
out the ways in which expertise and lay knowledge are articulated 
and then validated or invalidated by authorities (Katz and Miller, 
1996; White, 2008). But some rhetoricians feel compelled to go 
further, to assist in the public demarcation of science from pseudo-
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science and other problematic knowledge domains. This 
demarcation can be understood as a fundamentally rhetorical 
process (Taylor, 1996). It can be read as hostile to civic deliberation 
or as hostile to science (Fuller, 2013; Gross, Levitt, and Lewis 
1996). A fundamental question for rhetoricians is thus their role in 
mediating public arguments about science. 
Finally, how do we ensure substantive public engagement and 
participation in science-based policy discourse? This may require a 
remodeling of the public sphere as a “discursive realm in which 
individuals and groups may transcend their private concerns to 
interact freely in ways conducive to forming a common sense of 
reality in order to highlight the multiplicity of public spheres and 
the value of dissensus in establishing group identity and solidarity 
within a broader public (Hauser, 1987, 438; Fraser, 1990; Phillips, 
1996). 
High-level problems in the theory of publics need not be solved 
before answers to these questions can be formulated. For example, 
as Miller observes, genres instantiate the values of the publics that 
employ them and thus can serve as productive sites for 
investigation and intervention (Miller, 1994, 68). We noted a need, 
however, to engage scholars outside the orbit of rhetoric of science 
to make progress in solving the problem of public agency. Scholars 
from fields including public relations and critical theory have 
recently attempted to initiate just such a conversation (Heath, 
Waymer, and Palenchar, 2013; Asen, 2015). Sociology, 
anthropology, and philosophy also conceptualize publics in ways 
that may help rhetoricians. Finally, integrating rhetorical criticism 
with “big data” methods may help both augment our capacity for 
imagining publics and complicate our definitions of them—thereby 
revising our approaches to agency in public deliberation over 
science.  
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
Building on nearly two decades of scholarship, risk continues to be 
an arena in which scholars in RSTM productively investigate the 
concept of agency (Beck, 1999). For rhetoricians, a fundamental 
problem in risk deliberation is an over-reliance on technocratic 
reasoning, which fails to recognize broader forms of expertise and 
decision-making. Whereas other disciplines have construed risk 
within frameworks that reduce complexity and limit deliberative 
performance (e.g., risk assessment, decision theory), rhetorical 
scholars have increasingly embraced the indeterminacy, 
contingency, and precarity inherent in the concept of risk (Walsh 
and Walker, 2016).  
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In this way, the rhetorical scholarship on risk can be usefully 
distinguished by treatments of uncertainty that expand rather than 
restrict possibilities for creative, just, and participatory forms of 
agency. Early studies applied rhetorical analysis to reveal the 
limitations of traditional risk discourses; more recent work has 
revealed the ways in which boundary work around risk and 
uncertainty both enables and disables lay agency (Miller, 2003; 
Danisch, 2010; Paroske, 2009; Sauer, 2003; Scott, 2006).  
Gaining further precision and consistency in the rhetorical 
effects of “managing uncertainty” is a productive area of inquiry in 
reclaiming rhetorical agency, particularly when uncertainties are 
viewed as inventive performances both facilitated and constrained 
by the sites and events of risk (Miller, 2007). To this end, we might 
consider how to leverage rhetorics of risk and uncertainty to expand 
the reach of rhetorical research. How could rhetorical agency be 
harnessed to help inform innovative policy forums, civic 
participation models, or public-facing communication through 
well-designed usability documentation or interactive media? 
Answers to these questions can help manage uncertainties in risk so 
that rhetoric becomes fundamental in expanding the possibilities 
for public deliberation and decision-making. 
RESPONSE FROM CAROLYN R. MILLER 
“Agency” has become one of those conceptual boundary objects that 
shape-shifts its way across conversations, both adaptively plastic 
and robustly identifiable, enabling synergy among disciplinary 
social worlds and producing definitional polysemy. In the 
presentations and discussions at the 2015 Association of Rhetoric, 
Science, Technology, and Medicine (ARSTM) meeting, we heard 
agency associated with matters of trust, responsibility, expertise, 
authority, guilt, duty, ethos—and at each turn it looked different 
and participated in a different conversation.  
Agency raised many issues for us—theoretical, practical, and 
social. Theoretical: Is agency a capacity or an effect, a possession or 
an attribution? Is it associated with the human only or also with the 
non-human? Is agency a symbolic or material force? Social: in what 
ways is agency individual, collective, distributed? Can we delegate 
agency? For example, in working with big data and quantitative 
analysis, what happens to the agency of the researcher? Practical: 
How do we locate, identify, and cultivate agency—within ourselves, 
within others? How do we identify and take on the social roles with 
which agency operates? What, for example, is the role-agency of 
scientists, citizen-scientists, scientists-as-citizens, rhetorical critics? 
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Finally, we might ask whether rhetorical agency is distinctive or 
different from other forms of agency. Does any social role 
necessarily carry with it some form of rhetorical agency? Is rhetoric 
a prerequisite for agency as a scientist or as a citizen? Does 
rhetorical power itself create the possibility of social agency? As 
scientific research, technological development, health and safety 
risks, and policy-making become automated and globalized, 
understanding agency—and with it the possibilities of action—
become ever more urgent.  
A visual epitome of many of these issues is the Neoplatonic 
Great Chain of Being, or scala naturae (“ladder of nature,” Figure 
1), which orders all existence in a fixed hierarchy, with God at the 
top of the chain and successive levels of angels, humans in their 
various ranks, wild and domestic animals, plants, minerals and 
metals, and the underworld at the very bottom. This image brings 
before our eyes questions about the location and distribution of 
agency, the sources of authority, and the possibility of rhetoric 
(though the answers it offers likely differ from those we post-
moderns would favor).  
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Figure 1: Visualization of the Great Chain of Being, Didacus Valades, 
Rhetorica Cristiana, published in Perugia, Italy, 1579, plate 2 after 
page 220. (Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org) 
Copyright © 2016 Lynda Walsh et al. 
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